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Abstract
This paper studies an alternating-oﬀers bargaining game between a time-consistent and a time-
inconsistent player who processes information on own preference type imperfectly that ﬂows during the
course of the game. The time-inconsistency is modeled by quasi-hyperbolic discounting and the "naive
backwards induction" is used as the solution concept. By using cognitive and mood state approaches, we
model learning of naive time-inconsistent player. The main result speciﬁes a clear connection between the
model parameters and the equilibrium in the most general sense. For special cases, critical delay times
and probabilistic structure of the agreement and relations between them are characterized. Comparative
statics imply that more naive players and players with milder self control problems are oﬀered higher
shares more frequently.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C78, D83
PsycINFO Classiﬁcation: 2340, 2343
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1 Introduction
Are the standard preferences able to explain people’s observed choices? Do people have systematic biases in
their decision making? Do they learn about these biases that can be potentially taken advantage by other
parties in strategic environments? How does this aﬀect the equilibrium outcome? Does one bias exacerbate
or alleviate another bias’ good or bad eﬀects? Except the ﬁrst two, whose answers are provided by a
growing body of both anecdotal and experimental evidence supporting deviations from standard preferences,
these questions are not addressed enough in economics literature. The aim of this paper is to answer these
∗E-mail: zafer.akin@etu.edu.tr
1comprehensive questions partially in a strategic environment where agents, who potentially have present
biased preferences and process information imperfectly, play a sequential bargaining game.
There are many systematic self-serving biases mentioned both in psychology and economics literature
one of which is the present biased preferences. It is frequently observed in experimental studies that there
is a sharp short run drop in valuation and a faster decline rate in the short run than in the long run. In
other words, people have preference for immediate gratiﬁcation and they tend to pursue it although they
may regret about this pursuit in the future. Theoretically, agents with present biased preferences have a
relative preference for payoﬀs (beneﬁts and costs) at an earlier period over payoﬀs at a later period with one
important exception that the relative weight given to the earlier period’s payoﬀ increases as the earlier period
gets closer. The observations mentioned above are properly captured by quasi-hyperbolic discounting model,
which is frequently used way of modeling the present biased behavior. This kind of behavior can be seen as a
lack of self-control and leads to time-inconsistency.1 There is a growing literature incorporating this type of
preferences in a wide range of contexts and some fruitful explanations about seemingly anomalous behavior
that are not fully explained by standard economic theory have been produced (Strotz, 1956; Laibson, 1997;
O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a).
One approach in this literature synthesizes quasi-hyperbolic discounting and noncooperative games. Since
individuals suﬀer from present biasedness not only in their personal decisions but also in strategic environ-
ments, this approach is an interesting and a valid application. There is a very new but growing literature on
noncooperative games played by agents who have present biased preferences. Some examples are as follows:
Akin (2004) incorporates quasi-hyperbolic discounting into a self-investment game followed by a sequential
bargaining game; Dellavigna and Malmendier (2004) analyze the contract design of ﬁrms when they face
time inconsistent consumers; Saraﬁdis (2005) examines the intertemporal price discrimination game between
a durable good monopolist and time inconsistent consumers; Akin (2007) introduces learning in a sequential
bargaining framework and shows that learning is a possible explanation for bargaining delays and Chade
et.al. (2008) study inﬁnitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, where players have quasi hyperbolic
discounting.
In the quasi-hyperbolic discounting framework, in addition to time consistent exponential type, which is
the benchmark case, three types of agents with time inconsistent preferences are considered: sophisticated
ones who are aware of their time inconsistency, naive ones who are completely unaware, and partially naive
ones who are partially aware2 of it (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001). Akin (2004, 2007) and Saraﬁdis (2005)
1Agents with time inconsistent preferences, quasi hyperbolic discounting, self control problems are used interchangeably in
the paper.
2Being completely aware of self control problems is actually not a systematic bias since the agent can rationally make
decisions by taking into account this own characteristic. However, being naive or partially naive about these problems is a
systematic bias in the sense that the agent can only make rational decisions for the current self but not for the future selves
2assumed all types except partial naives but Dellavigna and Malmendier (2004) examined especially partially
naive types. We consider all types in our framework.
Regarding the mentioned questions at the beginning, some learning framework has to be incorporated
into the time inconsistent preferences. Therefore, we consider a dynamic structure of the preferences by
incorporating learning of partially naive players about their own type. In the existing models, there are a few
papers that just mention learning and its eﬀects on the equilibrium behavior (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001,
Dellavigna and Malmendier, 2006). Learning of hyperbolic discounters is ﬁrst examined in a noncooperative
game context by Akin (2007). He introduced naive learning in a bargaining framework and characterized
the conditions for bargaining delay caused by naive learning where the naive agent systematically learn her
own type during the game.
The hyperbolic agent presumably has a given time preference structure and agents are categorized into
diﬀerent types based on their perceptions on this structure. The literature takes these types as given and
examines implications of these. On the other hand, incorporating learning is a dynamic and a more reasonable
approach. This paper attempts to improve the dynamic theory at hand by adding another behavioral
dimension. It not only makes the perceptional dimension more sophisticated but it also incorporates a
psychological characteristic most people have. Speciﬁcally, we assume that there are two possible (cognitive)
states of the world. In one of the states, the agent is hyperbolic, in the other; she is either exponential or
hyperbolic. In addition, independent of her cognitive state, she can be in two diﬀerent psychological states
(mood states). At each mood state, she potentially process information imperfectly and diﬀerently.3
Mood state approach can be interpreted in two diﬀerent ways. First, the agent who has two diﬀerent
psychological moods at each time may or may not take into account a speciﬁc/relevant information depending
on her mood in her decision making process. At each of her moods, she disregards (treats) the information
(as irrelevant) with potentially diﬀerent ﬁxed probabilities. Second, the agent tends to misinterpret some
information contradicting her prior beliefs based on the mood state ("disconﬁrmation bias", Wason, 1960). In
other words, she may misinterpret the available information, probably as supporting previously held beliefs,
with diﬀerent probabilities depending on her mood (e.g., she has a more severe tendency of misinterpretation
in one mood state than she has in the other).
The ﬁne distinction between two interpretations is that in the former, the agent either accepts the
information or rejects it. When she accepts, information is processed as it should be and perfectly, and
and, without learning, this occurs systematically.
3We assume that mood states follow a Bernoulli process, a sequence of independent identically distributed Bernoulli trials
(States themselves can be correlated and state transitions can be deﬁned accordingly but we will not pursue this approach in
this paper .See Compte and Postlewaite, 2008, for a model that incorporates this approach). We also assume that there is no
correlation between the cognitive states and the mood states. As an extension, a framework with correlated cognitive and mood
states can be analyzed (e.g., a more naive agent may tend to be in a mood state where she ignores/misinterpret the information
with a higher probability).
3accepting or rejecting the information is probabilistic.4 In the latter, the agent accepts the information
for sure but she may misinterpret it. She correctly and perfectly processes the information if it supports
previously held beliefs. However, she may misinterpret the information and process it as supporting her prior
beliefs even if it does not actually support them. Here, whether the agent misinterprets the information is
probabilistic.
Given these behavioral assumptions, this paper examines the behavior of agents having, potentially,
self control problems (along with the mentioned characteristics) in a bargaining framework. We focus on
alternating-oﬀers bargaining game as the strategic interaction environment for the following reasons. It is
a sequential (not a one shot) game played multi periods (potentially, inﬁnite horizon) and this allows the
modeler to observe the eﬀect of present biased preferences explicitly. It is a two person game where diﬀerent
types of hyperbolic agents can interact (not a one person game played by diﬀerent selves of one player). It
is a dynamic game in the sense that during the course of the game, feedback and information is generated
about the underlying uncertainty if there is any. Hence, it allows learning. Since it has a wide range of real
life applications, there is a large literature about sequential bargaining games and it has a well established
theory.
In the present bargaining model, two players -one is partially naive, the agent, and the other is exponential,
the principal- are engaged in an inﬁnite horizon alternating-oﬀers bargaining game. The agent is partially
naive due to the way how her cognitive system works. Particularly, she has two cognitive states. In one
state, she is hyperbolic (hyperbolic state in which she has the same beliefs with a sophisticated agent). In
the other, she is either exponential or hyperbolic (mixed state in which she has partially naive beliefs in
which she assigns a lower probability to being hyperbolic than it should be). She becomes more sophisticated
over time by observing possible rejections. Speciﬁcally, the agent has prior beliefs on the likelihood of the
cognitive states and she updates this prior5 with the feedback ﬂowing during the course of the game, which
is ﬁltered depending on the mood state.
We assume that each player knows other players’ available strategies and their current preferences.
However, beliefs about their own and others’ future preferences may diﬀer across diﬀerent types. Exponential
and sophisticated players’ current and future preferences are common knowledge among all players. On the
other hand, naive and partially naive players misperceive their own future preferences and believe that their
beliefs about themselves are shared by all types of players. The beliefs about the mood states are such that
the exponential player knows everything that the modeler knows but the partially naive player inherently
4If the ignorance of the relevant information is interpreted as mistakes by the agent, then we can make the following argument:
rather than a gradual learning, there may be a threshold accumulated information (disregarded/ignored since they are treated
as mistakes) level above which the agent inevitably concedes the implication of the accumulated information.
5Except the initial period, potential learning can be attributed to the rejections of each party. She may learn not only when
her oﬀer is rejected but also when she rejects an oﬀer.
4has these characteristics and is not aware of them.
Since the stationarity of preferences is violated in the framework of time inconsistency, the choice of the
solution concept is tricky. In this paper, we use "naive backwards induction" (NBI) as the solution concept
developed by Saraﬁdis (2005) and extended by Akin (2007) for games played by time-inconsistent agents.
In NBI, players play best response to what they think the opponents will play and the strategies have to be
sequentially rational.
By using NBI and the results from Akin (2007)6, we ﬁnd the following results. In the most general
case where imperfect information processing is allowed, there is a critical date before which the bargaining
game does not end for sure but this critical value may well be zero depending on the parameter values.
Moreover, after this threshold date, the agreement is probabilistic and the average delay time is calculated
accordingly. The critical value for the learning probability parameter is characterized so as for the game to
end immediately. When we examine the perfect Bayesian case, we have a similar result as in Akin (2007)
and show that this critical date is always larger than or equal to the one found in the imperfect information
processing case. However, the actual waiting time may well be greater in the imperfect processing case than
the one in the perfect processing case. In sudden learning case, we ﬁnd that for suﬃciently small learning
probability, there is immediate agreement. If this probability is larger than a speciﬁed threshold level,
then the agreement is probabilistically delayed. Comparative statics imply that against naive agents, the
exponential agent oﬀer a higher share more frequently (we mean "for a wider range of learning probability"
by "more frequently") to the more naive ones (higher ￿ β) and to the ones with less severe self control problems
(higher β).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the related literature
both in psychology and economics. In Section 3, we introduce the model in detail. In Section 4, we ﬁrst
characterize the equilibrium behavior in the most general case. We then examine the perfect Bayesian case
where there is perfect information processing. In the last part, we study a special case where the cognitive
states are mutually exclusive that leads to a phenomenon called "sudden learning" and some comparative
analysis are presented. Section 5 discusses the implications and limitations of the presented model and some
extensions.
2 Related Literature
People inherently have self-serving biases, which constitute a subset of behavioral biases, as opposed to the
perfect rationality assumption of the standard economic theory. Obviously, given these biases, agents who
6The solution concept NBI is especially used in ﬁnding the perfect equilibrium partitions in bargaining (Akin, 2007, has all
the details.) The rest here is basically intertemporal optimization given the stochastic structure of preferences.
5are aware of them can act rationally. However, the very nature of the existence of these biases is to be
unaware of them in most of the cases. Among these, self-serving biases are the most inborn ones that are
deﬁned as holding beliefs or having directed preferences that favor one’s own payoﬀ or satisfaction. Biased
beliefs may be about the payoﬀs, other players’ types, available strategies, environment and many other
things. Present biased preferences, disconﬁrmation bias and overconﬁdence are some well known examples.
Self-serving beliefs inﬂuence one’s judgments in many diﬀerent ways. Present bias aﬀects the relative
weight of payoﬀs at diﬀerent times that results in a judgment fallacy making people to discount near future
payoﬀs more heavily than the more distant ones. Overconﬁdence refers to a self-serving belief that makes
people overestimate their real performance. For example, overconﬁdence makes people to think that they
have better skills or knowledge than they actually have (Myers, 1996), or it can make people to ignore
relevant information in a decision making situation (McGraw et. al., 2004). Disconﬁrmation bias makes
people to disregard some information contradicting their previously held beliefs (Wason, 1960) and when
people base their decisions on these biased beliefs, their judgments would naturally be biased too. There are
no clear cut distinctions among these biases and most of the time, their implications overlap.
One of the implications of self-serving biases we focus on is imperfect information processing.7 Closely
related to the ones above, we now mention some other considerations in psychology literature referring to
limited/imperfect information processing.
People’s psychological states can aﬀect information processing, thereby eﬀort and performance. Nonper-
manence of failure or permanence of success phenomenon refers to attributing the failures to things that are
less likely to occur again in the future and making no such attributions in successes. Alternatively, perva-
siveness of success bias refers to attributing successes to a broader set of circumstances than is appropriate
(Seligman, 1990). These can be viewed as misinterpretation of available information.
In Benabou and Tirole (2002), a (Bayesian) agent makes a self evaluation on how able he is and he may
consciously decide to forget some negative experiences (selective memory). In Koszegi (2000), the agent
stops recording any further signal. However, the agent is conscious about how the information is processed
and takes this into account when forming beliefs (beliefs are not biased on average).
Negative aﬀective states may change the process how people make decisions. It is usually argued that
negative aﬀective states such as anxiety and sadness inﬂuence people’s ability to process information (e.g.,
7There may be plenty of reasons of imperfect information processing (Antonides, 1996). Self-serving biases cover a wide
range of those cases. However, here, we will approach imperfect information processing phenomenon from a more aﬀective,
visceral and noncognitive perspective. Present bias as a self-serving bias may itself cause imperfect information processing but
we discriminate these two and assume no mutual interaction between them. We treat the present bias as a cognitive process
and assume that it is not directly inﬂuenced and driven by the mood or aﬀective conditions (states). On the other hand, we
treat imperfect information processing as a noncognitive and aﬀective process that is not directly aﬀected or driven by present
biasedness. For a more formal discussion of information processing imperfections as the source of bounded rationality, see
Lipman (1995) in which he discusses partitional models, non-partitional models, and axiomatic approaches.
6Ellis and Ashbrook, 1988; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999). For example, there is some evidence that anxious
or sad individuals process information less systematically in judgment and decision making (e.g., .Sanbon-
matsuand and Kardes, 1988; Schwarz, Bless and Bohner, 1991).
According to Schwarz and Clore (1983), people routinely use their feelings as information and beliefs aﬀect
one’s feelings, thereby indirectly aﬀecting judgments. On the other hand, in mood congruent judgments,
mood congruent beliefs are assumed to be the real bases of judgments (Schwarz and Clore, 2003). Maia and
McCleland (2004) have parallel ﬁndings in which they ask participants for their feelings about the past twenty
trials in IOWA gambling task. They show that when participants asked about their feelings on choices, they
use their feelings when they decide among alternative options. In our interpretation of feeling as information
theory, people sometimes interpret the relevancy of the aﬀective information diﬀerently according to their
current mood condition. Thus, one’s mood condition indirectly aﬀects that person’s judgments by ﬁrst
aﬀecting the situation’s aﬀective information value. For example, a person can misinterpret her feelings
about her choices because her current mood is contradicting with her feelings on choices. Moreover, there
is a wide amount of empirical data showing that people treat alternative options diﬀerently when they are
induced diﬀerent mood conditions (e.g., in a positive mood condition, they become more risk averse while
they become more risk seeker in a sad mood condition, Isen, 2002). In this paper, we make information
processing dependent on the mood state in a stochastic way such that if someone is in a current mood state,
there is a ﬁxed probability that she correctly interprets her feelings on choices.
The other issue we focus on is, so called, cognitive states that are related to the perceptions on the future
preferences. It is generally considered that agents’ decisions are purely based on "cold" cognitive processes
but this may not always be the case. Most decisions elicit feelings before and after the decision making
process starts. This would happen in a variety of ways (Schwarz 2000). For example, the expectation for a
desired outcome can produce positive aﬀect towards that choice before we decide on that option or a decision
can induce negative mood if our expectations do not coincide with the results of our choices. We could claim
that emotions are somehow interacting with our cognitive system. The interplay between "emotional brain"
and "cognitive brain" is best handled by the dual self or dual system models8 (Metcalfe and Michel, 1999;
Kahneman, 2003; McClure et al., 2004).
8In our context, another way of modeling that allows interaction between emotional brain and cognitive brain can be
summarized informally as follows: a partially naive agent may act as a sophisticated agent (or become more aware of her type
by updating her beliefs) when her mood contradicts with her feelings about choices. Even if a partially naive agent currently
believes that she will not procrastinate in the future that is an optimistic belief, now, she may not procrastinate since she now
might be actually sad about her self-control problem. In other words, when her aﬀective interpretation about her feelings on
choices contradicts with her mood state, she can interpret her beliefs more rational than usual. Otherwise, she can underestimate
her self-control problem because she holds a positive belief in which she thinks she have control on it.
The model we propose in this paper only allows an indirect interaction between these two systems, not a direct one as
mentioned above.
7Metcalfe and Michel (1999) propose that there are two systems in the brain, a cool cognitive "know"
system and a hot emotional "go" system where the interaction between these two systems play a critical
role in self-control behavior in intertemporal decisions. The general characteristics of those systems are such
that the former is more complex, slow, develops late and controls the self-control behavior while the latter
is simple, reﬂexive, fast, developed early, and accentuated by stress. Their dual system model explains very
fundamental processes underlying self control behavior and similar models have been recently utilized in
economics to model addictive behavior and explain observed systematic biases.9
In a related model, Lowenstein et. al. (2003) investigates the qualitative nature of change of future
preferences of people who exaggerate the degree to which their current tastes will represent their future
tastes. They argue that people overestimate the magnitude of this representation, which leads to "projection
bias". In their model, They use state dependent utility functions (diﬀerent states can be interpreted as hot
and cool states) and projection bias means that predicted utility lies in between the utility given the current
state and the true future utility. They ﬁnd that this tendency leads people to consume too early in life and
leads to improper purchasing of durable goods. Our model is similar to this phenomena in the sense that
although the present bias will always emerge, the agent optimistically thinks the current present bias will
vanish in the future. In other words, the agent incorrectly thinks that her current state will change in the
future but actually it will not. In their context, Lowenstein et. al. (2003) emphasize that learning with
experience is not likely to occur although people are aware of this bias in a meta level.10
Finally, Neale and Bazerman (1985) examine experimentally the eﬀect of framing and overconﬁdence
on bargaining behavior and outcomes and ﬁnd that overconﬁdents exhibit less concessionary behavior and
perform worse than realistically conﬁdents do. In a related paper, Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) employ
self-serving biases to explain bargaining impasse. They provide experimental evidence showing that self-
serving biases cause impasse and result from selective evaluation of information, together implying that
information processing in a self-serving manner causes bargaining delay or disagreement. Similarly but
theoretically, we, in this paper, show that an agent’s biased information processing in the direction of her
own self-interest11 causes delay in agreement in a sequential bargaining framework.
9Bernheim and Rangel (2004) consider an addiction model where the agent is sometimes in a hot mood in which she consumes
the addictive good as opposed to her cool self’s will. Fudenberg and Levine (2006) proposes a simple dual-self model giving a
uniﬁed explanation for several observed irregularities, such as time-inconsistency and paradox of risk aversion in the large and
small rewards.
10By learning, Lowenstein et. al. (2003) mean the bias to diminish overtime but we use learning as becoming aware of the
underlying bias. Learning in their sense can also be considered in our context but we do not believe that the present bias does
diminish overtime with experience. In other words, we argue that β is ﬁxed meaning that there is no learning, but that ￿ β
converges to β overtime with experience meaning that there is increase in awareness.
11Perfect information processing refers to an unbiased evaluation of information but biased information processing is self-
serving in our context because, the information ﬂowing during the game will always indicate that the agent actually is optimistic
about her future preferences. Since the level of sophistication is negatively correlated with the equilibrium share, this bias is in
8On top of these linked and growing branches of the literature, the part of our model that deals with the
perceptions on future preferences proposes that the agent, cognitively, can be in two diﬀerent states (founded
on these perceptions) at any given moment; hyperbolic state (cool state) and exponential state (hot state).12
Moreover, there are two states of the world; pure hyperbolic state and the mixed state.13 The other part of
our model posits that the agent imperfectly processes the ﬂowing information based on the mood state and
then uses this information cognitively to update her beliefs on what the actual state of the world is. Given
the actual state of the world is the hyperbolic state, the process on the cognitive side during the game can
be called as “cooling down” (learning her actual preference structure), which means that the agent becomes
more sophisticated over time.
Generically, we use “learning” to actually stand for increasing self awareness. In our context, the agent’s
self awareness about what her actual future preferences for immediate gratiﬁcation are increases overtime. In
an environment with an overconﬁdent agent, learning means the improvement of the agent’s self awareness
about her ability or her potential to achieve something. For an agent suﬀering from disconﬁrmation bias,
learning denotes the enhancement of the agent’s self awareness about her judgmental imperfections leading
to more rational decision making.
3 Model
Let T = {0,1,2,...} be the inﬁnite set of possible agreement times. Let i ￿= j ∈ {1,2} and t,s ∈ T represent
players and dates, respectively. Let u =
￿
u1,u2￿
∈ U be a utility pair and U be the set of feasible utility
pairs where U =
￿
u ∈ [0,1]
2 |u1 + u2 ≤ 1
￿
. At each t ∈ T, i oﬀers a utility pair. If j accepts the oﬀer,
the game ends. In case of rejection, j oﬀers a utility pair at t + 1. Each player gets nothing if there is no
agreement.
We assume two diﬀerent types of players.14 One player is partially naive hyperbolic (PNHA), who can
potentially become sophisticated during the game, and the other is exponential player (EA). The PNHA is
not fully aware of her15 time-inconsistency. She thinks that she will be impatient in future periods but she un-
derestimates its level. The sophisticated hyperbolic agent (SHA) is fully aware of her time-inconsistency and
the direction of the agent’s own self interest.
12Hyperbolic state refers to the notion of being sophisticated and exponential state refers to the notion of being naive. We
call the exponential state as the hot state because the agent is naive and totally optimistic about her future preferences in this
state. In the hyperbolic state, the agent is sophisticated and totally aware of her future preferences that is why we call it as
the cool state.
13The mixed state (with some probability, she will be in exponential state in the future, with the complement probability,
she will be in hyperbolic state) can be interpreted as the agent being partially naive.
14There are actually four types: exponential, naive, partially naive and sophisticated agents. Naive and sophisticates are
basically the extreme cases of partially naive types. That is why we are only interested in partially naive ones.


























is the time-inconsistent preference for immediate gratiﬁcation or the self-control problem of the agent. ￿ β
(degree of naivete) represents an agent’s belief about what her β will be in all future periods. Thus, the EA
has β = ￿ β = 1, the SHA has β = ￿ β < 1 and the PNHA has ￿ β ∈ (β,1). While the SHA is located at one
extreme of the scale of awareness on the future preferences, the naive agent (NHA) is at the other extreme
of this scale where she is completely unaware of her time-inconsistency, β < ￿ β = 1. Figure 1 is the visual
representation of the actual and perceived self control problems.
We assume that each agent knows other players’ available strategies and their current preferences. How-
ever, beliefs about their own and others’ future preferences may diﬀer across diﬀerent types. We now brieﬂy
summarize these beliefs. Naive agents believe that they will not have time inconsistency in the future and
that this is common knowledge at every information set. Partially naive agents believe that it is common
knowledge that they will have some self-control problem in the future. NHA and PNHA recognize time
inconsistency of the others, if any, but not their own and they know all the opponents’ future preferences
correctly. Sophisticated players certainly believe at every information set that it is common knowledge that
they will have time inconsistency in the future. The previous statement is common knowledge among all
EA and SHA. In addition, EA is more informed than the naive player in the sense that he knows the naive
opponent’s learning potential but the naive agent herself is not aware of this.16 The psychological state
16Over-optimism or over-conﬁdence or both may cause a person to be naive about self-behavior in the future. It is agreed
that "on nearly any dimension that is both subjective and socially desirable, most people see themselves as better than average"
(Myers, 1996). Since patience can be seen as a kind of ability, it is plausible to think that people may consider themselves
more patient than others. [See Brocas and Carrillo (2004), Zabojnik (2004) and Pinto and Sobel (2005) for a more detailed
10Figure 2:
structure of the partial naive agents is not common knowledge among agents such that the partially naive
player is not conscious about them but the exponential player knows everything that the modeler knows.
Naive backwards induction is used as the solution concept. In NBI, each agent plays a best response to
what he/she thinks to be the opponent’s play and the strategies are required to be sequentially rational.
One important point is that due to self-misconceptions and misperceptions about the opponent, naive agents
may not be able to anticipate the opponent’s actions correctly and they may be surprised during the course
of the game. Akin (2007) elaborates on both the solution concept and beliefs in detail.
Figure 2 summarizes the model. There are two possible states of the world. One is hyperbolic state where
￿ β = β. The other is the mixed state where ￿ β = 1 with probability µ and ￿ β = β with probability 1 − µ. The
agent’s prior belief on the two states of the world is λ0 and 1−λ0, respectively. The actual state of the world
is the hyperbolic state where the PNHA will always employ β as the preference for immediate gratiﬁcation
as opposed to her current beliefs, 0 < λ,µ < 1. In addition, the actual state of the world is known by the
EA. We allow belief updating based on the signals received during the course of the game both in Bayesian
sense and a boundedly rational sense.
The signals received during the game are processed by the PNHA depending on the mood state. There
are two possible moods of the agent whose respective probabilities are θ and 1 − θ. In diﬀerent moods, she
discussion on over optimism due to positive self-image and related discussions.]
11accepts (interprets) the signal (correctly) with potentially diﬀerent probabilities α1 and α2, respectively.
With complement probabilities, the agent disregards (interprets) the signal (incorrectly).17 Without loss
of generality, we impose α1 ≥ α2. The αi values being strictly less than one embeds a bounded rationality
aspect into the agent’s behavior.18 Since, by construction, the information ﬂowing during the game always
signals the agent’s disadvantageousness, αi being strictly less than one implies a self-serving assessment in
bargaining.
Note that 0 ≤ λ,µ,θ,αi ≤ 1, i = 1,2. The θ and αi parameters are related to the behavioral characteristics
of the agent, exogenously given and do not change overtime.19 The λ and µ parameters are related to the
beliefs of the agent. The probability µ is exogenously given and do not change overtime but the probability
λ is the belief of the agent regarding the states of the world and it is subject to change based on the signal
processing.
Underlying uncertainty (state of the world) in the model is all about the PNHA and her perceptions. It
is common knowledge that the exponential player is exponential, and that he does not have any behavioral
characteristics like the PNHA. In other words, the exponential agent does not have any mood state (θ = 0
or θ = 1) and he perfectly processes available information (α1 = α2 = 1). Moreover, the EA knows the
actual state of the world. In addition, the followings are imposed regarding the information structure: The
characteristic of the EA and the probability assessments of the PNHA on the states of the world are common
knowledge. The behavioral characteristic of the PNHA is known by the EA. Moreover, at each even t, the
PNHA thinks that the game will end with the terms arising from the realized preferences at t but she may
be surprised. At each odd t, she oﬀers based on the realized preferences at t.
17By accepting the signal or interpreting it correctly, we mean that the agent updates her beliefs towards the true state
(hyperbolic state). By disregarding the signal or misinterpreting it, we mean that the beliefs do not change. Thus, in a
suﬃciently long time, she comes to believe in the true state almost surely (the game will not be delayed inﬁnitely, after
suﬃcient learning periods, it will end). This is because of the structure of the game in which each period the game is played
makes the agent update her beliefs towards the true state. In a diﬀerent game setting, there may be two or more conﬂicting
signals that result in ambiguous dynamics of the beliefs (Rabin and Schrag, 1999).
18Here, we focus on a sequential bargaining game and the outcomes of the game (oﬀers and accept/reject decisions) turn out
to be the signals about the states of the world. Given the assumption of an informed principal and the inherent characteristic
of the agent, the outcomes always signal the true state of the world (t period delay in agreement means t rejections by the
PNHA herself and the EA. Any conﬁrmation of the agent’s beliefs ends the game).
19Given this exogeneity, we implicitly assume that the signal and the mood state probabilities are not correlated. In a more
sophisticated and realistic model, this assumption can be relaxed in such a way that the received signal and the likelihood of
diﬀerent mood states may be correlated.
124 Equilibrium Characterization
In this part, we ﬁrst keep everything as general as possible and impose no restriction on the parameter
values, 1 > λ,µ,θ,αi > 0, i = 1,2. This allows a boundedly rational approach where the agent may ignore
or disregard available information depending on her mood state. We then look at a case where the PNHA is
a perfect Bayesian learner in the sense that she updates her beliefs on the states of the world based on the
information ﬂowing that is perfectly processed (e.g., α1 = α2 = 1). Then, we examine a special case where
the PNHA learns her own characteristic with a ﬁxed probability (sudden learning) at each period. Finally,
we report some comparative analysis results.
Before proceeding, it will be useful to mention the equilibrium shares of the Rubinstein’s alternating-
oﬀers bargaining game (1982) where players are exponential and have discount factors δ1 and δ2 and then
the results from Akin (2007) when the players are potentially hyperbolic discounters:
Remark 1 In the inﬁnite horizon alternating-oﬀers bargaining game where both players have exponential
discounting with discount factors δ1 and δ2, the equilibrium payoﬀs are (x∗,1−x∗) = ( 1−δ2
1−δ1δ2,1− 1−δ2
1−δ1δ2). The
bargaining game between an EA and a PNHA ends always with shares(x∗,1−x∗) = (1−βδ 1−δ
1−￿ βδ2,βδ 1−δ
1−￿ βδ2)




1−￿ βδ2) but the EA rejects this
oﬀer, where x∗ is the share of the ﬁrst proposer. Moreover, a bargaining game between an EA and an SHA




1−βδ2 ) if the EA oﬀers ﬁrst, (x∗,1 − x∗) = ( 1−δ
1−βδ2,
δ−βδ2
1−βδ2) if the SHA oﬀers ﬁrst.
From here on, all mentioned shares are of the EA who is the ﬁrst proposer. For notational convenience,
we denote S =
1−βδ
1−βδ2, S = 1−βδ 1−δ
1−￿ βδ2 and ￿ S =
δ−￿ βδ2
1−￿ βδ2. S, S and ￿ S are all the EA’s share when he plays with
an SHA and is the ﬁrst proposer; he plays with a PNHA and is the ﬁrst proposer and he plays with a PNHA
and is the second proposer, respectively. The following relationships are satisﬁed S > S > δS > δS > ￿ S.
4.1 The Generic Case
In this subsection, we do not impose any restrictions on the model parameters and treat them as variables
in the most generic sense. Speciﬁcally, we do not allow any parameter to take an extreme value, 0 or 1.
This means that the cognitive states are not mutually exclusive (they are overlapping) and the agent’s mood
states can vary across and within the game and across periods.
The agent processes information in a limited sense depending on the mood state. She accepts (interprets)
the information (correctly) with ﬁxed and potentially diﬀerent probabilities at each mood state, α1 and α2.
In which mood state she is at each period is also probabilistic, θ and 1−θ. This indicates that she processes
the information with probability ρ = θα1 + (1 − θ)α2.
13The belief on the state of the world is initially given by the probabilities λ0 and 1 − λ0. At each period
that the agent processes the information, she updates her belief on λ such that if until period t, the agent
has processed the information s ≤ t times, then the updated belief is given by λs = λ0
λ0+(1−λ0)µs. Given this
updated belief, the eﬀective discount factor of the agent is given as follows:
δs = λsβδ + (1 − λs)(µδ + (1 − µ)βδ)
= βδ + µδ(1 − β)(1 − λs)
The following theorem states that there exists a date before which there is no agreement. This threshold
date may well be zero. The logic behind this result is the trade oﬀ that the principal faces. By delaying,
he can probabilistically make the agent more sophisticated whom he can extract more share. However, the
eﬀective discount rate is smaller than one so that the overall size of the pie is shrinking. Thus, this trade oﬀ
deﬁnes a threshold date (not probabilistic). The theorem also states that after this threshold, the agreement
date is probabilistic and this probability is characterized. This result is similar to the main theorem in Akin
(2007) with the exception that there is no probabilistic agreement after the threshold in the latter.
Theorem 1 In the game played between an exponential player and a partially naive player (having behav-
ioral characteristics speciﬁed above), in any stationary NBI solution, there exists an integer t∗
GC ≥ 0 such
that the game ends at period t ≥ t∗
GC, t ∈ t∗
GC +2i, i = 0,1,2... if t∗
GC is even (t ≥ t∗
GC +1, t ∈ t∗
GC +2i+1,
if t∗
GC is odd) with probability f(t), t˜NegBin(t∗
GC,ρ) where f(t) is the probability mass function and
NegBin(t∗
GC,ρ) is the negative binomial distribution with parameters t∗




periods for the game to end on average. If t∗
GC = 0, the game ends immediately.
Proof. Let the EA be the ﬁrst proposer. He oﬀers a share at each even period if the game did not end
by then. The other case is very easy to adopt. Note that by lemma 1 in Akin (2007), the PNHA’s oﬀers
are never accepted. That is, the game never ends at odd periods in which the PNHA makes an oﬀer. Deﬁne
(s,t) as the state of the game played at period t where the PNHA has processed the information s ≤ t times.
Then, the EA’s problem can be expressed by the following value function:
V (s,t) = max{R(s,t),δ
2E(V |s,t)}
R(s,t) is the immediate reward function that is the best payoﬀ the EA can get by ﬁnishing the game at
(s,t) and R(s,t) = xs
t where xs
t = 1 − βδ 1−δ
1−δδs and δs = βδ + µδ(1 − β)(1 − λs). E(V |s,t) is the expected
continuation value of the game and can be written as
E(V |s,t) = ρ2R(s + 2,t + 2) + 2ρ(1 − ρ)R(s + 1,t + 2) + (1 − ρ)2R(s,t + 2)
δ
2E(V |s,t) = δ
2(ρ2xs+2
t+2 + 2ρ(1 − ρ)xs+1
t+2 + (1 − ρ)2xs
t+2). (1)
14The following argument shows how this is derived. If the game is delayed one period, then with probability
ρ, the EA’s expected share will be x
s+1
t+1 = 1−βδ 1−δ
1−δδs+1 and with probability 1−ρ, his expected payoﬀ will
not change, xs
t+1 = xs
t. At t + 2, again with probability ρ, the EA’s share will be xs+2
t+2 = 1 − βδ 1−δ
1−δδs+2 and




t+1 if the PNHA updates her beliefs at t+1; if
she does not update her beliefs at t+1, then with probability ρ, the EA’s share will be x
s+1
t+2 = 1−βδ 1−δ
1−δδs+1




The rationale behind the form of the value function is the following: at each period the EA makes an
oﬀer, he will choose either ending the game by making an acceptable oﬀer or delaying the game by two
periods by making a rejected oﬀer. The EA can get R(s,t) if he consents to the terms of the PNHA at t.
If the EA believes to extract more share from the PNHA in expected terms, he will delay the game. Thus,
at time t, the EA will choose the option that gives a higher payoﬀ, xs
t or expression 1 above. Note that
xi
j = xl
k if i = l for all j and k, j ≥ i, k ≥ l. This implies xs
t = xs
t+2. Thus, the comparison will be between
R(s,t) = xs
t and δ
2E(V |s,t) in expression 1. In other words,
xs
t(1 − δ
2(1 − ρ)2) and δ
2ρ(ρxs+2
t+2 + 2(1 − ρ)xs+1
t+2).
Remember that the shares are functions of constant model parameters β,δ,µ,λ0,ρ and number of successful
learning periods s. Now, deﬁne a function F(s;β,δ,µ,λ0,ρ) as follows:
F(s;β,δ,µ,λ0,ρ) = xs
t(1 − δ
2(1 − ρ)2) − δ
2ρ(ρx
s+2
t+2 + 2(1 − ρ)x
s+1
t+2)
This function deﬁnes a critical value for s, s∗, that makes the EA indiﬀerent between ﬁnishing the game





min{s ∈ {0,1,2...}|F(s;β,δ,µ,λ0,ρ) ≥ 0}, if F(s;β,δ,µ,λ0,ρ) ≥ 0 for some s.




We now call s∗ as t∗
GC (GC stands for generic case) that is the number of periods of delay that the EA can
tolerate. Given this critical value, the EA is consent to wait until t∗
GC periods of successful learning occurs.
This means that the EA is ready to delay the game for two periods since the expected discounted value





t￿ . Period t￿ is
not known ex ante since it is stochastically determined by the PNHA’s learning process that has a negative
binomial distribution.
A negative binomial distribution is the probability distribution of the number of failures before the rth
success in a Bernoulli process with probability ρ of success on each trial. In other words, for t independent
and identically distributed Bernoulli trials with success probability ρ, it gives the probability of s successes
and t − s failures, with success on the last trial. In our case, NegBin(s∗,ρ) = NegBin(t∗
GC,ρ) distribution
gives the probability of t − t∗
GC failures and t∗
GC successes in t Bernoulli(ρ) trials with success on the last
15trial, t ≥ t∗



































GC)!. Function f(t) gives the probability of t∗
GC
successes in t periods with a success in t. In our context, the EA makes a proposal at even periods and f(t)
gives the probability of ﬁnishing the game at an even period t ∈ t∗
GC +2i, i = 0,1,2... if t∗
GC is even. If t∗
GC
is odd, the game ends at t ≥ t∗
GC +1, t ∈ t∗
GC +1+2i with probability f(t) because agreement never occurs






f(i). The number of successes in t periods with probability ρ of success on each trial is, on




ρ number of periods on average.
If t∗
GC = 0, this means that it is not optimal to delay even one period, so the game ends immediately.
The following corollary shows that there exists a threshold level of learning probability such that if the
probability is less than this level, the game ends immediately.
Corollary 1 For any given model parameters β,δ,µ and λ0, there exist an information processing probability
ρ, ρ∗, such that whenever ρ ≤ ρ∗, immediate agreement occurs.




















t+2 − (1 − 2ρ)x
t+1
t+2)







t+2 − (1 − 2ρ)x
t+1
t+2) < 0 (2)































When ρ = 0, there will be an immediate agreement, t∗
GC = 0, since F(s;β,δ,µ,λ0,0) > 0. On the
other hand, when ρ = 1, F(s;β,δ,µ,λ0,1) = xs
t − δ
2xs+2
t+2 may well be negative implying delay of the game,
t∗
GC ≥ 0. In addition, since dF
dρ < 0, there must be a level of ρ, ρ∗, such that for all ρ ≤ ρ∗, there would be




t+2 > 0, then ρ∗ = 1.












by treating s as a continuous variable. Since dF






























ds , it is easy to show that dF
ds > 0. Thus, ds
dρ > 0. Then, the fact that s is a
positive integer (s(ρ) is actually a step function) and a similar argument above necessitates a threshold level
of ρ.
In words, the opponent of the PNHA realizes that the continuation payoﬀ increases with the learning
probability. If the learning probability is too low, it is not worth to delay the game. Incentive for delaying
increases as the learning probability gets closer to one (given the other model parameters). This obviously
implies a threshold level for this probability.
On the other hand, independence of the state transitions from the state itself (the underlying random
variable is i.i.d.) is crucial because ex ante, there is an integer t∗
GC referring to the number of successes
(number of periods that the agent processes information correctly) but ex post, regardless of what happened
in previous periods, the game looks the same from the perspective of the EA in terms of the incentives to
delay the game.
The immediate agreement and delay results (like corollary 1) can be written in terms of other parameters
of the model as well but since the focus here is on the parameter of information processing, we state only
this result.
4.2 Perfect Bayesian Case
We now examine a case where the agent is a perfect Bayesian learner such that she processes available
information perfectly. In other words, we impose α1 = α2 = 1. Given that the actual state of the world is
the hyperbolic state, the PNHA updates her beliefs on the state of the world as the information ﬂows during
the course of the game.
As mentioned at the beginning, the exponential player is aware of the behavioral characteristics of the
PNHA and plays accordingly. The PNHA is not aware of this own characteristic because we think that
17this type of behavioral characteristics of the PNHA naturally arises and this is how things are coded in her
brain.20
Naive hyperbolic player updates her prior probability as she observes the outcome of each stage game.
How long the game lasts will depend on the parameter values. As long as the game continues, the agent will
face rejections. This causes belief updating that occurs as follows: The prior probabilities are λ0 and 1−λ0
for the hyperbolic and mixed states, respectively. Let λt denote the belief at time t if the game is played t
periods. A very simple Bayesian updating procedure indicates that λt = λ0
λ0+(1−λ0)µt. If we let t ∈ R, then
we get intuitive results dλt
dt > 0 and d2λt
dt2 < 0. This means that the probability of hyperbolic state increases
overtime at a decreasing rate. Then, the eﬀective discount factor is again given by δs = βδ+µδ(1−β)(1−λs).
Given this preference proﬁle and the information structure mentioned earlier, the following result is
obtained that is similar to the main theorem in Akin (2007) with the exception of the diﬀerence in updating
processes.
Proposition 1 In the game played between an exponential player and a partially naive player, in any
stationary NBI solution, there exists a date t∗ such that the players do not reach an agreement before t∗
and at each time t ≥ t∗, the players reach an agreement immediately at date t when the exponential agent
oﬀers; they reach an agreement at date t + 1 when the partially naive agent oﬀers.
Proof. This proof is identical with the proof of the theorem in Akin (2007) with the exception of modeling
approaches to learning. In Akin (2007), the agent believes that using βδ discount factor in the future is a
random variable distributed with some unknown parameter η, which measures the probability of the agent
using βδ at any date t, and η is distributed with a beta distribution. In the current model, the beliefs are
on the states of the world in which the agent is either in hyperbolic state or in mixed state. The updating
structures diﬀer due to these underlying models. In the proof, these two models only make the eﬀective
discount rates diﬀerent but the logic and the steps are identical.
Corollary 2 t∗ ≥ t∗
GC ≥ 0.
Proof. The function deﬁned in Theorem 1, F(s;β,δ,µ,λ0,ρ), determines the critical value t∗
GC in generic
case. The critical value in the perfect Bayesian case, t∗, is determined by the same function in which ρ = 1
since ρ = θα1 + (1 − θ)α2 and α1 = α2 = 1 in this case. By Corollary 1, we know that ds
dρ > 0. This implies
that t∗ > t∗
GC for continuous values of s. For discrete values of s, we have to write t∗ ≥ t∗
GC. By deﬁnition,
t∗ and t∗
GC may well be zero. Thus, t∗ ≥ t∗
GC ≥ 0.
This corollary indicates that the number of periods of delay in perfect Bayesian case is at least as large as
the number of successful learning periods in imperfect information processing case. This is intuitive when one
20The issue of more sophisticated behavioral players is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research. For a
model of self deception and endogenous memory, see Benabou and Tirole (2002).
18thinks about the trade oﬀ the EA faces. Incentive to delay the game increases with the learning probability.
However, this does not mean that the delay in the former will always be more than the one in the latter.
The reverse may well be the case.
4.3 Sudden Learning
In this section, we will assume that µ = 1. This means that there are two mutually exclusive states of
the world, exponential or hyperbolic. In other words, whenever there is a rejection and this information is
processed (correctly) by the PNHA, it is revealed that the state of the world is the hyperbolic state (she
becomes sophisticated). This occurs with a ﬁxed probability at each t ≥ 0 (sudden learning) and after being
sophisticated, the agent stays sophisticated. The ﬁxed probability can be deﬁned as ρ = θα1 + (1 − θ)α2
based on the mentioned framework. The following proposition characterizes the relationship between the
equilibrium structure of the bargaining game and the ﬁxed probability ρ.21
Proposition 2 Let an EA and a PNHA play the alternating-oﬀers bargaining game with the speciﬁcations
of this section. Then, in any stationary NBI solution, for any δ ∈ (0,1), β ∈ (0,1) and ￿ β ∈ (β,1), there
exists a learning probability ρ∗ such that for all ρ ≤ ρ∗, the EA oﬀers S and agreement occurs immediately.
For all ρ > ρ∗, the EA oﬀers S in which the agreement is delayed with probability 1 − ρ. When the PNHA
oﬀers, either, with probability ρ, she oﬀers δS to the EA and the game ends immediately or, with probability
1 − ρ, she oﬀers ￿ S to the EA and the agreement is delayed.
Proof. First remember the previously stated deﬁnitions: S =
1−βδ
1−βδ2, S = 1 − βδ 1−δ
1−￿ βδ2 and ￿ S =
δ−￿ βδ2
1−￿ βδ2.
Take any δ ∈ (0,1), β ∈ (0,1) and ￿ β ∈ (β,1). Now deﬁne two value functions for the EA’s problem as follows:
V (t + 1) = max
{A, R}
{δS,δV (t + 2)},
V (t) = max
{S,S}
{S,E(S)}, where t ∈ {0,2,4,...}.
At each even period, the EA either oﬀers S or S because the opponent is either sophisticated in which case
the EA can get S or partially naive in which case the EA can get S. He does not oﬀer anything between S
and S because a partially naive opponent rejects this oﬀer anyway and a sophisticated opponent is ready to
accept S. If he oﬀers S, both types accept for sure. If he oﬀers S, this is accepted with probability ρ and
rejected with probability 1 − ρ and his continuation payoﬀ is V (t + 1). Thus, the expected value of oﬀering
S, E(S), is ρS + (1 − ρ)δV (t + 1).
21Mood states can take simpler forms such as the PNHA may stay in the same mood during the whole game, or information
processing probabilities may be equal or one of the information processing probabilities may equal to zero. At each case, the
ﬁxed probability, ρ, can be deﬁned in terms of model parameters (θ,α1,α2). If she stays in the same mood during the whole
game, given the mood i, ρ = αi. If the information processing probabilities are equal, ρ = α1 = α2. If one of the information
processing probabilities is equal to zero, then ρ = (1 − θ)α2 if α1 = 0, ρ = θα1 if α2 = 0.
19At each odd period, the EA either accepts or rejects the opponent’s oﬀer. The opponent is either
sophisticated in which she oﬀers δS that is accepted or still partially naive in which she oﬀers ￿ S. By lemma
1 in Akin (2007), oﬀers of the PNHA are never accepted. In other words, the game can end only at even
periods in which the EA oﬀers unless the PNHA becomes an SHA at an odd period. The immediate reward
function at odd periods takes two values δS or ￿ S. However, unless the oﬀer is δS, the EA rejects the oﬀer
with a continuation payoﬀ V (t + 2). Thus, we can write the followings:
E(S) = ρS + (1 − ρ)δV (t + 1)
V (t + 1) = ρδS + (1 − ρ)δV (t + 2)
V (t) = V (t + 2)
The value function takes the form of V (t) for even periods and V (t) = V (t + 2) because of the static
environment in which the opponent’s type is exogenously determined with a ﬁxed probability. Then,
V (t) = max
{S,S}
{S,E(S)}
V (t) = max
{S,S}
{S,ρS + (1 − ρ)δ(ρδS + (1 − ρ)δmax
{S,S}
{S,E(S)})}
Now, if E(S) > S, which means that the EA oﬀers S, then
E(S) = ρS + (1 − ρ)δ(ρδS + (1 − ρ)δE(S)) (3)
If E(S) ≤ S, which means that the EA oﬀers S, then
E(S) = ρS + (1 − ρ)δ(ρδS + (1 − ρ)δS) (4)
These two expressions should be consistent in the sense that E(S) > S or E(S) ≤ S is satisﬁed where E(S)
is deﬁned in (3) and (4), respectively. By using E(S) > S and (3), we get:
H(δ,β,￿ β;ρ) =
ρS(1 + (1 − ρ)δ
2)
1 − δ
2(1 − ρ)2 − S > 0 (5)
By using E(S) ≤ S and (4), we get:
H(δ,β,￿ β;ρ) ≤ 0 (6)
Note that
dH(δ,β,￿ β;ρ)
dρ > 0, H(δ,β,￿ β;0) < 0 and H(δ,β,￿ β;1) > 0 since S > S. Thus, there must be a
threshold value ρ∗ satisfying H(δ,β,￿ β;ρ∗) = 0 such that for all ρ ≤ ρ∗, (6) is satisﬁed. Otherwise, (5) is
satisﬁed. Thus, if ρ ≤ ρ∗, the EA oﬀers S in which case the game ends immediately and if ρ > ρ∗, he oﬀers
S in which case the game is delayed with probability 1 − ρ. When the PNHA oﬀers, she is still naive with
probability 1−ρ in which case she oﬀers ￿ S and the game is delayed. She is sophisticated with probability ρ
in which case she oﬀers δS and the game ends immediately.
20Corollary 3 If ρ > ρ∗, then the game is delayed ￿ t periods with probability ρ(1 − ρ)
￿ t.
Proof. Suppose ρ > ρ∗. By Proposition 2, we know that as long as the PNHA does not become an SHA,
the game is delayed. Then, a delay of ￿ t periods has a probability of (1 − ρ)
￿ t. Moreover, the game ends
at period ￿ t + 1 with probability ρ. Thus, the game is delayed ￿ t periods and ends at ￿ t + 1 with probability
ρ(1 − ρ)
￿ t.
The proposition characterizes a threshold level for the learning probability above which it is optimal to
treat the opponent as a sophisticated agent for the EA. The corollary speciﬁes probabilistically when the
bargaining game ends.
4.3.1 Comparative Statics
We now ﬁnd how the values of ρ∗ change with diﬀerent parameters of the model by applying implicit












d(ρ∗) > 0 and
dH(.)
d(￿ β) > 0 for all parameter values. This means that the EA may oﬀer S to a
more naive opponent whom he does not oﬀer S originally. In other words, against a more naive agent (a
higher ￿ β), the EA continue to oﬀer S even the agent’s learning probability is lower. The intuition behind
this is that against a more naive opponent, the payoﬀ that can be guaranteed by the EA is lower since the
minimum share that the more naive agent can accept is higher. Thus, against an agent with a higher ￿ β, the
EA is more willing to take a risk and oﬀer S.










d(β) cannot be assigned any sign analytically but based on some simulations, we found that
dH(.)
d(β) > 0, and
since
dH(.)
d(ρ∗) > 0, we get
∂ρ∗
∂β < 0. This means that as the self-control problem of the agent lessens (a higher
β), the EA is more likely to oﬀer S. As β increases, both E(S) and S decrease but S decreases more than
S. This leads to an increase in tendency to oﬀer S and this means a lower ρ∗.
215 Discussion and Conclusion
Identifying behavioral biases of people, determining implications of them and then, if possible, suggesting
operational policies are extremely relevant and crucial issues since people frequently exhibit bounded, rather
than perfect, rationality. In this paper, we investigate the behavior of agents in a strategic environment who
potentially have two well known biases. Since this is a theoretical but not an experimental paper, we do not
identify potential biases. We basically try to extract implications of some imposed biases that are observed
frequently. This helps us understand the behavior of players who try to take advantage of other players
having these biases.
We believe that having a preference for immediate gratiﬁcation emerges as a very important factor and
it gives surprising and seemingly irrational outcomes we face both in individual decision making and in
strategic environments. Savings and investment behavior, project completion, intertemporal individual deci-
sion making problems, price determination, several advertorial strategies employed by ﬁrms and bargaining
situations are some examples.
Moreover, since the very nature of acting rationally necessitates being aware of what the agent desires
and how she optimizes under both feasibility and behavioral constraints, learning in the sense of increasing
awareness is also a crucial part of rationality. This is the main reason why we choose imperfect information
processing along with the present bias among the many biases presented both in economics and psychology
literature. In addition, they together elucidate the intuition behind the persistency of implied anomalous
behavior. This point indicates the fact that one bias may wash out the eﬀect of the other or it may exacerbate
the other’s eﬀect22. In our context, being naive about own preferences is a bias that makes the agent better
oﬀ in a bargaining setting but learning own preferences overtime by experience alleviates the positive eﬀect
of this bias. On the other hand, imperfect information processing (due to conﬁrmation bias) is another bias
and in the existence of both of these biases, the latter prevents the lessening of the eﬀect of the former. In
this sense, one bias does not exacerbate the eﬀect of the other but it provides permanence of the other’s
eﬀect. Our mood state approach turns out to be a formal explanation of this persistency, e.g., imperfect
information processing causes the present bias to be persistent that actually makes the agent better oﬀ.
Although restricting the bias space into these two biases may seem as a limitation, this result can be stated
for any bias combinations having similar implications.
While we ﬁnd that being naive about own (present biased) preferences is advantageous, most of the
industrial organization literature ﬁnds that it hurts the decision maker (e.g., Dellavigna and Malmendier,
2004; Saraﬁdis, 2005). In these environments, we observe persistency of diﬀerent biases (Loewenstein, 1996;
Van Boven, Dunning and Loewenstein, 1999) and people do not / cannot correct these biases although having
22Besharov (2004), by using examples of time inconsistency, regret, and overconﬁdence, examines how biases may oﬀset each
other’s eﬀects and the implications of correcting biases.
22them is costly. In this case, permanence of them is less likely. In this paper’s framework, however, people
actually get better oﬀ by failing to appreciate the bias they have, hence they do not have any incentive to
overcome this bias in the sense of learning and becoming more aware of it23. Hence, it is more likely to see
a permanence of the bias. Moreover, even if they become more aware overtime, they have an incentive to
imitate to be naive. In this sense, examining alternating-oﬀers bargaining game as the medium of interaction
is more interesting in terms of its implications24, but it is possible to extend this work by considering diﬀerent
types of games.
In this paper, we model information processing in a speciﬁc way by assuming that the number of learning
period is a random variable that has a negative binomial distribution. This is actually a simple way to
model the behavior we focus on and we conjecture that even if it is assumed diﬀerent stochastic learning
structures for learning, the results do not change signiﬁcantly. However, the learning focused on here is
better to be understood as case by case learning (This can be called as meta-learning). It is diﬃcult to talk
about learning in a global sense meaning that agents become fully aware of a bias they have regardless of
the decision making problem.
As Babcock et.al. (1995) argues, people may recognize self-serving biases of other people but they tend
to overlook the ones they may have. Rabin and Schrag (1999) raised a question of how economic implications
might depend on people’s awareness of others’ conﬁrmatory bias and they continue:
"One possibility is that people might exploit the bias of others. A principal may, for instance,
design an incentive contract for an agent that yields the agent lower wages on average than the
agent anticipates, because the agent will be overconﬁdent about her judgments in ways that may
lead her to exaggerate her yield from a contract."
We assume that the principal is aware of the existence of the biases the agent has and acts accordingly25.
Given this assumption, our mood state approach naturally gives rise to some policy issues from the perspec-
tive of the principal, namely, mood induction. A numerous strategies used by producers (suppliers of goods
and services in general) can be seen as mood induction. Presenting pre-funding options, bundling of several
services under the same contract, pointing out tempting characteristics of products, supermarkets having
stands for foods to try and slow music in the background, car dealers oﬀering test drives, real estate agen-
cies showing sample houses, free trial periods of cable TV’s and cell phones are some examples of strategic
23In especially intertemporal games, being naive refers to the concept that we call as "believing is as if actually being" under,
of course, some informational assumptions.
24Other reasons of choosing alternating-oﬀers bargaining game were mentioned in the introduction (it is a sequential, inﬁnitely
played, two person, and dynamic game that has a wide range of real life applications and a well established theory).
25This example overlaps almost perfectly with the example of this paper which is the bargaining game. The principal’s design
is (wage) bargaining game and the naive agent in advance anticipates a higher wage but it turns out to be less than what she
anticipated (as a result of learning).
23behavior of suppliers to exploit the bias of consumers. These are examples of principal trying to activate
the agent’s hot system in the sense of Metcalfe and Michel (1999). On the other hand, in our context, the
principal try to induce moods in which processing information is more likely (activating cool system) because
information processing makes the principal better oﬀ.
In conclusion, this paper is an initial step to investigate the behavioral characterization of agents having
self-serving biases. However, extending this into more general settings still remains an issue that needs further
research. Possible extensions are to relax the informational assumptions, to allow for correlated cognitive
and mood states, to generalize the learning dynamics (especially, to allow for two or more conﬂicting signals
in a diﬀerent game setting that result in ambiguous dynamics of beliefs as in Rabin and Schrag, 1999), to
relax the information processing structure and to consider diﬀerent types of strategic environments.
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